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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Degree:

ASSESSING
MARITIME
CYBER
SECURITY
AWARENESS IN NAVIES OF THE GULF OF
GUINEA COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA

Master of Science

In the contemporary era, an area of security that has been acknowledged by security
experts as an emerging threat is maritime cyber security. This threat in recent times
has cost the maritime industry huge sums of money largely because of the low level
of awareness on the part of personnel in the industry. Navies also rely on cyber
systems and other interconnected technologies for their day-to-day operations.
However, this reliance comes with potential cyber attack risks. Therefore, this study
investigated the awareness of maritime cyber security in the Ghana Navy. The
following objectives were assessed: the current state of maritime cyber security
awareness in the Ghana Navy; the level of preparedness of the Ghana Navy to deal
with Cyberattacks; and the proposal of an effective maritime cyber security
framework for protecting the Ghana Navy. The research employed a mixed-method
approach. The qualitative aspect, consisting of 17 interviews with personnel with
cyber security backgrounds helped in achieving objective three (3). Furthermore, the
study was undertaken on a sample size of 116 personnel from the Ghana Navy using
formulated maritime cyber security survey questionnaires and disseminated through
QuestionPro online software. This helped to address objectives one (1) and two (2)
The quantitative data was analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) version 26 including multiple logistic regression analyses. However, the
qualitative data was analyzed using MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2022 software. The
study revealed that the level of awareness of maritime cyber security in the Ghana
Navy was high. In terms of age, it was revealed that those in the age range of 31-40
years had a high level of awareness of maritime cyber security compared to the other
age ranges. Additionally, the research revealed that the level of preparedness of the
navy was average. Finally, a proposed maritime cyber security framework was
developed to help guide the operations of the navy in the interim.

KEYWORDS: Maritime cyber security, Ghana, Training, Risk management,
Cyber attacks, Cyber security framework.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Background and context

Globally, security is one of the utmost concerns for all nations. It is related to the
notion of peace and the elimination or stopping of the risk of threat in every facet of
our life (Haque et al., 2022). In the contemporary era, an area of security that has
been acknowledged by security experts as an emerging threat is maritime cyber
security. (Dalaklis et al., 2022). According to Hareide et al. (2018) maritime cyber
security is made up of two (2) terms namely ‘maritime security’ and ‘cyber security.
The same authors further indicated that maritime security has no definite meaning,
however, it could be related to other concepts such as maritime safety and sea power
as mentioned by Bueger (2015) where physical domain characteristics of maritime
security are looked at. Though there is no single definition for maritime security,
some proponents of security such as Dalaklis and Maximo (2022), Siebels (2020)
and Okonkwo (2017) assert that this issue encompasses threats that include illegal
fishing acts, piracy, armed robbery, trafficking of narcotics, arms proliferation
including human trafficking.

Consequently, the second term cyber security has its roots in information security
and it involves the practice or process whereby Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) systems are preserved or protected in terms of their
confidentiality, integrity, availability from, and defended against damage,
unauthorized use or exploitation within the cyberspace (ABS, 2016; Dalaklis et al.,
2021). To this end, maritime cyber security can be seen to be part of maritime
security, associated with the defense from cyber risks or threats of all kinds of
maritime cyber systems. Further, Hareide et al. (2018) support that, maritime cyber
security is concerned with the lessening of the challenges of cyberattacks on
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maritime operations, and naval operations are not immune from this challenge in
cyberspace with the advent of digitalization.
The maritime industry, in recent times, has seen its ship Operational Technology1
(OT) systems being intensively developed as a result of digitalization, integration
and networking. Scholars such as Sanchez-Gonzalez et al. (2019) and Dalaklis
(2018) argued that shipping in general which includes maritime operations as well as
naval operations is under the influence of the digitalization phenomenon. As a result
of this development, complex and computer-based technology systems have
emerged, and hence there is a pressing need to safeguard the maritime industry
including major stakeholders like Navies from cyberattacks and vulnerabilities (Tam
et al., 2019; Hareide et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2017). Developing countries such as
those bound to the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) are also adapting to this “new era” of
technological advancement in their maritime industry and naval operations. For
instance, navies like Ghana Navy, Nigerian Navy, and Cote d’Ivoire Navy to
mention a few have established and operate Maritime Operations Centres (MOC)
with shore-based surveillance equipment, and Ships with sophisticated technologies
providing surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence in their maritime domain
(Dalaklis, 2019).

Furthermore, with developments in electronically supported navigation where
systems are progressively being networked and incorporated, examples like
Automatic Identification System (AIS), Electronic Chart Display and Information
System (ECDIS), Auto Pilot (AP), Radar, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to
mention a few, navies are ever more reliant on these cyber systems for safe and
efficient navigation (Hareide et al., 2018). On the other hand, studies by BIMCO et
al. (2017) and Progoulakis et al. (2022) indicates that the coming together of
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and OT generates possible

1

Operational Technology is the application of both hardware and software to regulate and monitor
physical processes, devices, and infrastructure
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cyberattack vectors enemies with intent, and determination as well as resources to
obstruct maritime operations and naval operations. The reliance on these
interconnected technologies by the maritime industry including navies of the GoG
countries comes with potential cyberattack risks. There are already recorded cases of
cyber incidents in Africa such as the maritime cyberattack incident on Transnet in
South Africa (Pieterse, 2021).

From the above, it is clear that cyber security is becoming an important dimension of
maritime security, hence the need for GoG countries like Ghana to raise awareness
on maritime cyber security among maritime industry stakeholders including
personnel of the Ghana Navy. Awareness raising in navies of GoG countries should
be viewed as paramount because the human factor or element forms the weakest link
in the cyber security attacks (Zhang & Ghorbani, 2021; Canepa et al., 2021;
Richardson et al., 2020; Mc Mahon, 2020; Ana et al., 2019). Thus, adding cyber
security knowledge and skills to the safety ethos of Ghana Navy personnel at the
MOCs and onboard ships is crucial. Accentuating this point, Alop (2019) supports
that investing in education through awareness raising is necessary. In any case,
assessing the level of maritime cyber security awareness of personnel in the Ghana
Navy constitute the main subject of inquiry in this study. Further, this study seeks to
find if the Ghana Navy is prepared to mitigate maritime cyber security.

1.2.

Problem Statement

The maritime domain or space is open to all users, at the same time, it provides an
opportunity for food security, transport, and recreation to mention a few. Navies
worldwide use the maritime space as a means to protect their sovereignty and project
the power of their states. Furthermore, commercial ships use it for the movement of
cargo or goods thereby supporting trade globally. Due to globalisation and
technological advancement, the increasing impact of modern technology in the
maritime industry including navies cannot be overemphasized. However, as navies
and other maritime industry stakeholders increase their usage of these technologies,
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cyber attackers or cybercriminals are also assiduously working around to detect and
exploit their feeblest links which most scholars have concluded as humans (Canepa
et al., 2021; Mc Mahon, 2020). Hareide et al. (2018) in their study assert that
notwithstanding the increase in media reportage on cyberattacks in the maritime
industry of which navies are included, there seems to be insufficient understanding
about the impact these cyber incidents could cause to navigation systems and other
maritime installations.

In recent times, fierce storms and rough seaways are no longer the biggest threats to
the maritime industry. Modern ships depend on computer systems and satellites
communications and these make them vulnerable to cyberattacks on their
navigational systems, critical software as well as operational systems. The maritime
industry depends on equipment such the AP, GPS, AIS, and ECDIS to mention a
few. These technologies are vulnerable to a cyberattack (Hareide et al., 2018 & Lee
et al., 2017). Cyberattacks are progressively becoming common in present-day times.
For example, the NotPetya wiper attack on A.P. Moller-Maersk in late 2017 cost the
concerned company hundreds of millions of US dollars (Lee et al., 2017). Further,
cybercriminals in recent times, have the ability to conduct cyberattacks that could
cripple shipping business, maritime operations including operations of MOCs and
patrols of naval ships, thereby compromising the safety and security of ship’s crew
as well as passengers (Minnaar, 2019). Navies are also victims of cyberattacks and
was evident when AIS data was spoofed to fake a UK Royal Navy destroyer HMS
Defender in Russian waters (Cronje and Martin, 2021).

Considering Ghana Navy as a reflection of other navies of GoG countries, it relies on
the five (5) MOCs across the country, which provides a quite robust Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA) capability for effective monitoring of the maritime space
using effective electronic monitoring systems on the nation’s maritime environment
and to promptly share actionable intelligence with naval ships at sea. Additionally,
the country’s naval ships are equipped with certain modern systems, such as AIS,
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ECDIS, GPS, Radar, as well as other key systems onboard. Also, the navy relies on
intelligence information from the Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre
(MMCC) Zone F with modern systems as well, established by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to ultimately mitigate maritime
crime activities within the GoG (Broohm et al., 2020). All these ICT-based systems
are susceptible to cyberattacks. It is therefore essential that maritime cyber security
awareness of personnel is raised and skills imparted in order for them to avoid high
impact mistakes while using the internet as well as ICT devices including systems
onboard.

Thus, assessing the level of maritime cyber security awareness of

personnel at the MOCs, MMCC Zone F as well as those on board ships is very
crucial in protecting the Ghana Navy from attacks of cybercriminals.

1.3.

Research aim and objectives

The aim of this research is to assess the level of awareness of maritime cyber
security in navies of the GoG countries, with a focus on Ghana Navy. Furthermore,
the research is aimed at determining if the navy is prepared to handle cyberattacks.
The study will seek to address the following objectives:
● To assess the current state of maritime cyber security awareness in the Ghana
Navy.
● To ascertain the level of preparedness of the Ghana Navy to deal with
cyberattacks.
● To propose an effective maritime cyber security framework for protecting
Ghana Navy.

1.4.

Research questions

The research will seek to answer the following questions:
● What is the state of maritime cyber security awareness in the Ghana Navy?
● How prepared is the Ghana Navy to mitigate or prevent cyberattacks?
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● Is there any maritime cyber security framework that guides the operations of
the navy and what are its basic principles?

1.5.

Significance of the research

The findings of the study are projected to contribute to security practices and serve as
a theoretical or knowledge-building venture for the Ghana Navy, West Africa (WA)
sub-region, and Africa at large. The results of this research can be used to develop a
framework for the training of operators at MOCs, the Fleet, MMCC Zone F, and the
entire navy's workforce. Further, the research is expected to make an impact on
policy regarding maritime cyber security in the Ghana Navy and the maritime
industry at large. In addition to the aforementioned, the study would help narrow the
gap in the literature regarding maritime cyber security awareness of navies in the
GoG states, the WA sub-region, and Africa in general. Also, the findings of this
research have the potential to bring about significant social change by giving the
Ghana Navy a more objective assessment of the existing level of awareness of
maritime cyber security, which will allow for more effective training on that.

1.6

Expected results

The collection and analysis of data from correct sources would enable the researcher
to come up with a maritime cyber security framework for the Ghana Navy. Further, it
is expected that the results will help raise the needed awareness of maritime cyber
security in the Ghana Navy and the GoG countries at large. Also, it is expected that
the results of the study will help know how well the Ghana Navy is prepared for
maritime cyber attacks.
1.7

Key assumptions and potential limitations

The research survey questionnaire would mainly be conducted within the Ghana
Navy and it is envisaged that key participants would be available to support willingly
in achieving the aim of the study. Also, with respect to the interview that will be
conducted to help with the qualitative analysis aspect of the study, participants would
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be selected based on their background in cyber security. However, the lack of or
insufficient scholarly data on cyberattack incidents in the GoG or Africa as a whole
posed as limitation. Furthermore, the lack of data on cyber incidents against navies
pose as limitation to the researcher, this is because majority of navies have neither
open nor official dissemination of accident reports including cyber security attacks.

1.8

Composition of the dissertation

The dissertation was organised into five chapters as illustrated in Figure 1:


Chapter 1: Introduction to the research: This focused on the background to
the research, statement of problem, aims and research objectives, research
questions, significance of the study, expected results, key assumptions and
limitations.



Chapter 2: Literature Review: It focussed on extensive overview of maritime
security threats in the GoG. Furthermore, it examined some cyber security
incidents in the maritime industry. Also, it looked at human element as a
weakness for cyberattacks.



Chapter 3. Research Methodology. It presents the research methodology and
methods that will be used in the study.



Chapter 4: Research findings and results discussions.



Chapter 5: It covered the conclusion and recommendations based on findings
of the study.
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Figure 1. Composition of the Dissertation.
Source ( Created by the Author)
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents discussions on maritime cyber security in the GoG. The
relevance of the chapter in the study was to explain thematic areas relevant to the
study of maritime cyber security in the GoG. This enabled the study to review
relevant discussions on the research questions. The outcome of the thematic areas,
therefore, enabled the study to achieve the study objectives. The presentation of the
chapter was based on these themes. The overview of maritime security threats in the
GoG, maritime cyber incidents in the maritime domain, maritime cyber security
regulation and framework. In the broader context of the concept, maritime cyber
security has negatively affected the security of the world’s maritime domain. This is
because this is an emerging threat and the maritime industry is not fully prepared in
terms of awareness, training, policies to mention a few.

2.2

Overview of maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea

The GoG is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean located along the Western and Central
African coasts. Geographically, it’s the Atlantic coast stretching about 3,240 nautical
miles (nm) which is approximately 6,000 km from Senegal to Angola (OkaforYarwood & Belhabib, 2020; Dalaklis, 2019). This coast comprises of states
including Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The GoG is of immense
strategic importance as it serves as a critical shipping route to the world for virtually
all of its littoral countries, including the landlocked countries of Mali, Burkina Faso,
Chad, Niger, and the Central African Republic which depend on access to the sea for
import and export of goods and services from and to major global markets
(Bourmaud et al., 2021; Suh, 2017).
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According to Dalaklis (2019), the GoG’s strategic shipping routes and huge
resources have increased economic activities and unfortunately also, attracted
criminal activities such as piracy, armed robbery at sea, illegal bunkering, illegal
unreported unregulated (IUU) fishing, smuggling, drug trafficking, maritime cyber
security, among others, which constitutes maritime security threats. It is imperative
to note that these threats ultimately impact negatively the economic development of
the entire region. This is evident on the fact that, there is a growing need for
enhanced maritime security cooperation in the GoG and the collective participation
of countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire including the rest of the GoG
countries is required in this regard to increase awareness among the population
(Ibaba, 2020).

The GoG environment is not immune to the radical ability of modern digital
communications and computing leading to all forms of cyber security-related issues.
In order to gain the advantages of modern technology, those operating in the
maritime industry must also become aware of and develop strategies to handle the
inevitable cyber security issues that modern computing systems bring with them
(Fitton et al., 2015). The increase in cyber attack-related activities globally raises
critical security concerns amongst the maritime community and navies in the GoG
are no exception. This is because cyber attacks interrupt the flow of goods and
services which impacts negatively on the global economy. It is imperative to note
that about 90% of the volume of global trade is transported through the sea (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2019; Kaluza et al.,
2010). Thus, any break in the transportation chain occasioned by acts such as cyber
attacks has dire security implications on global trade.

Lately, maritime security threats in the GoG have received the needed attention. For
example, the economic organizations such as the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and the Maritime Organization of
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West and Central African States (MOWCA) continue to devise ways to suppress acts
of all forms of security including maritime cyber security in the GoG. This was made
evident in the promulgation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct concerning the
repression of security-related activities in the maritime domain in West and Central
Africa (Mansaray, 2017).

An overview of the maritime security threats in the GoG revealed that, cybercriminal
activities could enhance other crimes such as piracy, arms and drug smuggling, and
human trafficking among others to fund their operations. This situation creates an
environment where criminals find themselves cooperating to achieve different ends
(Shane & Magnuson, 2016). Therefore, the maritime security threats in the GoG are
highlighted as follows:

2.2.1

Piracy

Pirate activities occur in the GoG because West Africa has many active ports
involved in both regional and international trade, and most often than not vessels not
only transit through the region but sail into the ports to either load or unload products
(Bueger & Edmunds, 2020; Aboh & Ahmed, 2018; Hasan & Hassan, 2016).
Therefore, that provides a wider opportunity for the pirates to attack ships that are
either on transit, or berthed or anchored.

Similarly, pirates have been reported to have hacked into a cargo management
system of an unnamed shipping company in March 2016 and identified where on the
targeted vessel the valuable cargo was located (Hand, 2016). This enabled them to
make a very fast and efficient raid on a vessel, going right to the container of interest.
The author further asserts that piracy over the period has had an effect on economies
all across the world. Similarly, a German-owned container ship with 8,250 TEUs
from Cyprus to Djibouti apparently had its navigation systems compromised by
hackers for 10 hours in February 2017 (Blake, 2017). The report indicated that the
ship's entire IT system was completely compromised until IT experts were brought
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on board to restore the systems. The aforementioned instances demonstrate the extent
to which modern-day pirates utilize hacking in the maritime industry and cause the
industry huge sums of money.

Likewise, a research report by Safety4Sea, revealed that pirate gangs in the Niger
Delta for instance generate approximately $5 million per year in direct income
through theft and hostage-taking (Safety4Sea, 2021). This loss and many others
shows the extent to which the industry loses money. Figure 2 shows the summary of
reported piracy incidents in four (4) GoG countries in 2018.

Figure 2. A summary of reported piracy incidents in four (4) GoG countries.
Source (Ofosu-Boateng, 2018)
2.2.2

Armed robbery

One key aspect when considering the impact of the use of digital technologies is their
ability to create dynamic connections between different locations in real-time leading
to enhance criminal activities interconnected. Armed robbery against vessels at sea is
a modern-day day challenge of the maritime and offshore industries because of the
use of modern communication to share information (Aboh & Ahmed, 2018). Recent
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incidents, especially on the West African coast, have reminded the shipping industry
and the public in general about the violence and cruelty with which armed attacks are
conducted, the dangers faced by those on board, as well as the significant losses that
may occur both in terms of human life and property as a result of information
sharing.

2.2.3 Human trafficking
Human trafficking is also another major maritime threat that lingers in the GoG.
Fitton et al. (2015) and Konrad et al. (2016) in their studies assert that developments
in communication and information technology have altered the ways in which
criminals collaborate across national borders and in the maritime environment. They
further indicated that logistics and surveillance challenges for naval and other
maritime stakeholders has made criminal actors to engage in human trafficking. Thus
the GoG serves as a potential means to human trafficking. Trafficking in persons
along with the links to organized crime and the significant human rights, economic,
social, and political impacts are acknowledged as endangering human and national
security (Abiodun & Dahiru, 2020). In most instances, criminals involved in the act
along the GoG consider human trafficking as the lowest risk activity for criminal
groups (Chapsos, 2016). Most forms of trafficking that take place in West Africa are
men, women, and children trafficked for labor and domestic work; women and
children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation through online activities
(Konrad et al., 2016).

2.2.4

Illicit Drug Trafficking

Communication being mainly dependent on IP-based systems, there is an increased
risk of information breach by criminals to disrupt the monitoring of illicit drug
smuggling along the GoG (Beseng & Malcolm, 2021). Information can be accessed,
usurped or corrupted the complexity of the networks and the multilateral and joint
operating environment also contribute to increasing the risk of information breach.
When this is done, small boats are tool for the purpose of illicit drug smuggling,
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especially small canoes, which have no documents aboard and which carry
passengers without identity cards (Ukeje, 2015). That method of transport avoids any
customs duty. In other empirically discussed overview of maritime security threats
in the GoG, Chamberlain (2008) discussed security threats in maritime domain.

Kim (2019) argued that the adoption of some measures such as introduction of the
International Shipping and Port Security Code, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
Container Security Initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism,
have helped enhanced maritime security and led to the protection of shipping in
general. Despite the argument advanced by the author, the shortfall of the article is
the fact that the author did not consider maritime cyber attacks to be one of the
organised crimes in the GoG region. This could be as a result of insufficient
awareness on the subject matter. This study addressed this in subsequent themes.

2.3

Cyber attacks or incidents in the maritime domain

Although maritime environments and ships may seem like unusual targets for cyberattacks, they are vulnerable due to the growing digitalization of the maritime
environment and the increased use of industrial control systems (ICS), IT systems
and OT systems. Cyber attacks are growing more common, and coordinated criminal
networks and opposing states are increasingly targeting all parties in the digital value
chain (Kesseler & Shepard, 2022). Figure 3 shows top-10 list of maritime cyber
threats or attacks categorised under similar characteristics among the incidents and
are ranked based on frequency and severity.
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Figure 3. Top ten (10) cyber incidents based on categorization.
Source (Meland et al., 2021)

Most reports and literature in recent times, share a common goal, that is the
frequency and severity of cyber attacks are increasing. According to Gehem et al.,
(2013), IBM in 2013 reported that the average business or organization experienced
about 109 cyber incidents or attacks. The authors further indicated that in 2014, the
same IBM in its Cyber security intelligence report indicated that over 95% of the
attacks can be attributed to human errors, ranging from poor password protection
including the usage of unsecured internet connection and others. In confirming to the
recent increase in cyber attacks, Loomis (2021) in his study posit that reports of
maritime cyberattacks increased by 400% in 2020, while attacks on port facilities or
systems and shipboard technologies increased by 900% over the previous three
years. Greenberg (2018) argues that after the NotPetya malware, a cyber attack
spread from infected Ukrainian tax-preparation software called MeDoc, Maersk was
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attacked and the company spent more than $300 million in repairs and remediation
over the course of 10 days before it could resume normal operations.

Similarly, according to (Kesseler & Shepard, 2022) in October 2020, an advanced
and powerful attack on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was able to
get past its dynamic cyber defences. Most likely, an old version of the Microsoft
SharePoint Web server caused IMO's public website, intranet, and other services to
be down for several days. Likewise, in 2017, Danish shipping company A.P. MollerMaersk was the target of a ransomware assault, which became one of the most
famous cyber events in the maritime industry. It is worth noting that all these attacks
caused these companies huge sums of money to restore their systems back. This goes
to shows how powerful cybercriminals have penetrated the maritime space.

It is necessary to mention that, 2020 and 2021 saw the most cyber attacks on the
maritime industry and ransomware cyberattacks was on the increase. For instance,
according to Kesseler and Shepard (2022), a Toll Group, an Australian transportation
and logistics company in the maritime supply chain, was struck by ransomware in
January 2020 and May 2020. In both situations, it affected their services. Similarly,
In October 2021, ransomware propagated into Danao's Management Consultants'
networks, a well-established IT firm serving the maritime industry since 1986.
Danao's Maritime Software Suite encompasses chartering, payroll, crewing,
analytics, document management, procurement, and online collaboration (Kesseler &
Shepard, 2022).

Although the aforementioned reports or incidents are worth noting for the maritime
industry, the authors of these reports fail to indicate what the contributing factors
were and whether the human elements in those organizations contributed to these
incidents or not or as a result of lack of awareness on the part of personnel or as
result of exposed shipping company/carrier IT-systems or OT systems. All these
were not demonstrated.
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2.4

Human element as the weakest link in maritime cyber security attacks

To begin with, even though cyber vulnerabilities of information systems have been
studied and written about a lot, there still exist some gaps, especially when it comes
to cybersecurity awareness among humans and the management of information
including communication technologies (Digrazia, 2018).

In recent times there has been a lot of progress in maritime technology, but the
industry including navies still relies heavily on humans, therefore human error is
understood to be an acknowledged danger in day-to-day activities (Barnett & Pekan,
2017). Hence, as a result of this, the connection between risk and safety has often
become complex. Furthermore, insecure information technology (IT) systems result
in substantial damages, and human action is largely associated all along the way with
the loss. Likewise, human mistakes are to be blamed for a lot of the cybersecurity
threats that happen in industries including the maritime industry (Webb et al., 2014).
Furthermore, according to the most recent analysis on data breaches conducted by
Verizon, 85 % of all data breaches are caused by human factor (Verizon, 2021).

Lately, organizations have demonstrated the need to raise their operatives or work
security awareness and knowledge so as to practice cyber hygiene and not be
manipulated by cybercriminals. For instance, in the studies of Boletsis et al.,
2021and Meshkat et al., 2020, they assert the human factor continues to be the key
most significant internal concerns that organizations face including the maritime
industry with regards to their cyber security. Similarly, this claim is supported by
data presented in the most recent BIMCO white paper on cyber security, which
shows that human error is the primary source of security challenges for 52 percent of
responding businesses (HIS Markit, 2020).

Conversely, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(2017) argues that although the human factor is seen as weakest link and blamed for
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about 80 to 85% of cyber attacks, the human error can be mitigated by training and
education, and the growth of a strong cyber safety culture. This will then allow
humans to act as robust firewalls against maritime cyber attacks or incidents.
Additionally, to reduce the risk posed by the human element in relation to cyber
attacks, Berg (2013) argued that there is the need for adequate training to raise the
awareness on maritime cyber security, the use of qualified personnel at the right
places, and further the application of the good management policies in the maritime
industry.

Consequently, it is therefore imperative, that the people who operate or take care of
digital systems have the right knowledge and skills to make sure that their decisions
and the decisions of others don't put the safety of activities in the maritime space at
risk. This is encouraged even more by the Just culture according to IMO (2010).
Also there is the need to for the maritime industry including navies to focus more on
developing their personnel to act robust firewalls against maritime cyber security.

Similarly, Bauer and Bernroider (2017) indicate that the most effective way is to
increase personnel or crew’s knowledge or awareness of cyberattacks and maritime
cyber security is through information security training, which should be mandatory.
That is the gap that is been presented in the maritime industry where personnel
sufficient knowledge on this emerging threat, maritime cyber security.

Sequel to the above, the gap that is research sought to achieve is to find out the level
of awareness of maritime cyber security in navies since they are key stakeholders in
the maritime industry as well.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will outline the methodology and approach that was used to perform the
research. Further, it will explain how the approaches or methods were used to answer
the research questions (RQ) mentioned in Chapter One. To help recap, this study
focused on the following RQ areas:
 RQ1

What is the state of maritime cyber security awareness in the Ghana
Navy?

 RQ2

How prepared is the Ghana Navy to mitigate or prevent cyberattacks?

 RQ3

Identify if there is any maritime cyber security framework that guides
the operations of the navy and what are its basic principles?

3.2 Methodology of the Study
According to Danzin (2010), the methodology of a study relates to how it is planned
to guarantee that data is collected in a way that provides accurate and reliable
answers to the research questions. Because the method used in a study improves the
validity and trustworthiness of the research's results and conclusions, research
methodology is crucial (Kothari, 2004). Consequently, this research made use of
both qualitative and quantitative methods (Figure 4), as derived from the
triangulation viewpoint, which is an approach that also falls in line with the study of
Johnson and Christensen (2019), who found it useful and implemented it into their
research.

The quantitative method assisted the researcher to obtain respondents’ perspectives
on the level of awareness of maritime cyber security in the Ghana Navy, the
importance of maritime cyber security knowledge, and how cyber resilient the Ghana
Navy is. Qualitative research methods are focused and require in-depth analysis of

19

details of a particular area of study. The qualitative approach will be used to acquire
an objective answer to the research question on how to establish an optimal maritime
cyber framework for the navy. The quantitative will be employed because this
method makes use of measurements and statistical analysis of data that are collected
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2018). Further, in quantitative research, it is
possible to collect numerical data to generalise results across groups.

Figure 4. Summary of Research Approach/Structure.
Source: (Created by the author)

3.3 Study Area and Data Collection
The research was conducted with Ghana Navy as the epicentre of attention. To begin
with, the areas that were focused on included the MOCs which are spread along
Ghana’s coast from the Western border to Aflao at the Eastern border. Other places
where the MOCs are located include Burma Camp in the Greater Accra Region,
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Tema also within Greater Accra and Sekondi in the Western Region. Further, the
Ghana Navy Fleet and MMCC Zone F shore-based infrastructure also formed part of
the study area. With respect to the data collection, Ghosh (1992) posits that data
collection is a systematic process of assembling observations or measurements in
research to attain a purpose. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were
employed in this research. A survey questionnaire was administered to participants to
solicit information from them.

3.4

Data Sources

There are diverse methods used to collect data and these fall under two groups, that
is primary and secondary data (Douglas, 2015). This research would collect both
primary and secondary data. Researchers or scholars agree that the mark of a good
case study is the adoption of different data sources, an approach that enhances the
credibility of the data. Given that, this research would employ both primary and
secondary data as a form of data triangulation to guarantee the credibility as well as
the reliability of the information that will be obtained. A survey questionnaire was
conducted within the Ghana Navy and participants were drawn from the Fleet,
MOCs, and MMCC Zone F. With respect to the interviews, participants were drawn
from different organizations across the world with backgrounds in cyber security

3.6 Data Analysis
The survey questionnaire was divided into four (4) sections; Section A focused on
the respondent’s background, examining issues like demographics, with Section B
focusing on identification of the awareness in relation to maritime cyber security.
Further, Section C focussed on the investigation of standard operating procedures
and Section D looked at the preparation of the navy against maritime cyber attacks.
The quantitative data was analyzed using Microsoft Excel and Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26 and also both descriptive and inferential
statistics be used. Descriptive statistics include the data for age, gender, and level of
education. On the other hand, principles of inferential statistics were used to
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determine the level of awareness of maritime cyber security. The responses from the
survey questionnaire were finally analysed to draw conclusions. QuestionPro
software was used to administer the survey questionnaires and it was chosen due to
its convenient organisation features including the ability to export data to other
softwares for further study. Furthermore, information gathered from the interview
helped to assess the need for a framework for maritime cyber security to guide the
operations of navies.

3.6 Reliability and validity
This research's mixed-method approach yielded profound insights and details
concerning the objectives of the research. With regards to the semi-structured
interviews, the questions on the maritime cyber security framework were carefully
crafted and validated by the Professor (supervisor) with extensive experience in the
navy and maritime sector. For the quantitative part, large number of naval personnel
(116) who participated lead to achieving a valid and reliable research outcome.

3.7 Sampling, selection of participants
A sample size was derived using the Cochran’s formula (Cochran 1977). The sample
size was determined based on proportion of individuals (84%) who had high level of
awareness on cyber security in a previous study conducted in Ethiopia (Demissie
Gizaw et al., 2018).
The formula is as stated below:
n =
n - The sample size
z = 95% confidence interval (standard value 1.96).
e - The desired level of precision or level of acceptable error = 0.05
n =
n = 3.8416×0.1344/0.0025, therefore, n = 206
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Therefore, the sample size that was targeted for the quantitative aspect of the study
was 206 with the assumptions of 95% confidence level and 5% precision. However,
some of the respondents did not answer the online survey, hence, ended up with the
arrival of respondents’ feedback of 116.

3.8

Ethical Considerations

According to Creswell (2014), ethical consideration involves the protection of
participants to guarantee the trust and integrity of the study as well as guard against
misconduct that is likely to echo negatively on the participant’s organization. Hence,
this research complied with the WMU Research Ethics Committee standard.
Participants’ consent was sought and recorded before the survey questionnaire and
the interviews were conducted. Hence, the confidentiality of the retrieved data was
strictly maintained. Further, for the purpose of transparency and mutual trust, the
purpose, essence, sequence of discussions, and intended uses of data were explained
to participants. The information that was collected was kept secret and anonymous,
and it was stored safely with a password and it would be deleted safely when the
study is over.

3.9

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the study methodology, detailing the tools and procedures employed
to compile this dissertation and provides context for the data sources. Mixed method
comprising quantitative and qualitative research were described and how the data of
this study were collected. Furthermore, this chapter explained how the estimated
sampling size was arrived at using Cochran’s formula.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapters provided the basis and indicated the methodology that was
used to conduct the research. The main findings of the research will be presented in
this chapter, along with a discussion of how those findings compare to those of
previous studies. The purpose of data analysis is to support the attainment of the
study's objectives. The expected outcome of this chapter therefore includes a critical
understanding of the current awareness level of maritime cyber security in the navy
and how well prepared the navy is in relation to cyber attack threats. Consequently,
the data analysis enabled the researcher to come up with a maritime cyber security
framework for the navy. First part of chapter deals with quantitative data analysis
and the later part will analyse the qualitative data and draw inferences from it.

4.2 Research Findings: Quantitative Analysis and Discussion
Survey questionnaires were sent to personnel of the Ghana Navy, both officers and
ratings through QuestionPro online platform and in person on the field as well. The
presentation of the research findings from the survey questionnaires was
characterized into four sections. The sections or thematic areas comprise the
demographic characteristics of respondents, maritime security awareness, assessing
standard operating procedures, and preparations of the navy against maritime cyber
attacks. The findings of the survey questionnaire helped the researcher to address the
RQ1 and RQ2. The interview questions were also qualitatively analysed and
discussed as well.

4.2.1

Demographic characteristics of respondents

A total of 116 respondents were sampled for the study. Most respondents
representing 65 (56%) were between the ages of 31-40 years followed by those
between 18-30 years 44 (37.9%), few respondents 4 (3.4%) were between the ages of
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41-50 years and 3 respondents representing 2.7% were above 50 years. The
significance of the data regarding the age of respondents lies in the fact that the
researcher collected responses from personnel who had previous relevant work
experience. The implication of the respondents’ characteristics to the study was
observed in respondents’ responses which indicated understanding and situational
awareness with regard to the level of maritime cyber security awareness. The
substantial number of knowledgeable respondents lends credibility to the results of
the study's data collection and, consequently, its findings as depicted in Table 1.
With regards to the highest level of education attained, the results showed that
majority of respondents 47 (40.5%) had SHS/SSS, 39 (33.6%) had first degree, 14
(12.1%) had Diploma/ HND and 8 (6.9%) had master’s Degree as shown in Figure 5.
With respect to gender, most respondents 109 (93.9%) were males whilst the
remaining 7 (6.1%) were females. The demographic characteristics is as illustrated in
Table 1.
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of respondent’s (N=116). Source (Reseacher)
Variable

Frequency

%

18-30

44

37.9

31-40

65

56.0

41-50

4

3.4

>50

3

2.7

Basic

8

6.9

SSS/SHS

47

40.5

HND/Diploma

14

12.1

First Degree

39

33.6

Master’s Degree

8

6.9

109

93.9

Age (Yrs.)

Educational level

Gender
Male
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Female

7

6.1

Figure 5. Respondents’ level of Educational Distribution.
Source (Researcher)

The gender status or distribution was also analysed and it plays a key role with
respect to awareness of maritime cyber security. The gender analysis carried out in
this research is not restricted to the participation of females in the study alone, but
instead allows for the collection of a broader spectrum of viewpoints in relation to
the objectives of the study. Accentuating the earlier point, Hudson (2011) in his
study noted that a broader spectrum of viewpoints provides reliable empirical data on
the gendered nature of maritime security related issues, ideas, and practices to which
maritime cyber security is no exception. Consequently, with respect to the findings,
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male respondents were 109 out of 116 counts corresponding to 93.9% and 6.1% were
females (Table 1). One could attribute the high per cent of male respondents to the
male dominant nature of the military profession. The military is traditionally viewed
as a man-dominated field, which goes to elucidate the overwhelmingly male
percentage. However, the small proportion of females in the study shows that more
women should be included in discussions about maritime security, including
maritime cyber security in Ghana and the GoG at large.

4.2.2 Awareness of maritime cyber security
This section sought to obtain the respondents' awareness level of maritime cyber
security. Respondents were first and foremost assessed to rate the threat levels that
the variables presented to them pose to Ghana’s maritime security in the survey
questionnaire. The diverse responses with corresponding percentages obtained are
illustrated in Figure 6. From the study findings, the respondents identified or rated
IUU fishing and smuggling as high threats with 70.79% and 62.81% respectively as
shown in Figure 6. However, respondents considered or rated maritime cyber attacks
as least with score of 47.65%. The reason majority of the respondents assigned to the
least rate of 47.65% was that they believed the other threats presented to them are
day to day threats that they encounter at sea or hear on the media compared to the
maritime cyber attack, hence the least score assigned.
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Figure 6. Maritime security threat perception in terms of awareness in the GoG.
Source (Researcher)

Furthermore, the proportion of naval personnel with awareness on maritime cyber
security was determined. Awareness was classified into two (2) as; low level of
awareness and high level of awareness. Consequently, awareness on maritime cyber
security was assessed by asking ten (10) questions. This was done by using a Likert
scale with five (5) point ratings; “Very low”, Low “Average”, “High” and
“Extremely high”. The respondents were allowed to choose only one response. A
scoring technique was assigned to each rating. Extremely high was given the highest
score of 5, high (4), average (3), low (2) and very low (1). The individual score was
added and the sum was determined. Depending on the summative score of the
questions, since there are ten questions that was used to access awareness, an
individual score would fall between 10 and 50 with an average score of 30. Any
respondents with a score below the average (<30) was classified as having low
awareness, whilst those with scores above the median (>30) were classified as
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having high awareness. Any individual with a score equal to the average (=30) was
classified as having average awareness.

The results showed that the proportion of naval personnel with high level of
awareness of maritime cyber security was 72/116 (62.1%) and those with low level
of awareness was 44/116 (37.9%) (Figure 7). The findings from the aforementioned
imply that the awareness level of maritime cyber security in the Ghana Navy is high
considering that 72 out of the 116 respondents demonstrated a high level of
awareness representing 62.1% on the subject matter compared to the 44 respondents
that demonstrated low level of awareness representing 37.9%. However, this result of
high awareness is in contrast to that of the study of Heering et al. (2021), where they
assessed the level of awareness of maritime cyber security to be low among port
authorities, government bodies and other maritime companies.

Figure 7: Proportion of naval personnel with awareness on maritime cyber security.
Source (Researcher)

It is worth noting that, though the level of awareness in the navy was assessed to be
high, one of the questions which sought to know if personnel had undergone official
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training on maritime cyber security revealed interesting feedback. The results as
demonstrated in Figure 8 indicated that 89% responded “No” while 7% of
respondents indicated “Yes”. The remaining 4% indicated “Not Sure”. The inference
that can be drawn here is that, there is the need for more maritime cyber security
training to be factored into the training regime of the navy to help raise further
awareness among personnel of the navy. The need for more training in enlightening
further awareness is supported by the results of the question if respondents needed
training on maritime cyber security. All the respondents indicated “Yes”, that they
need training, and is this depicted in Appendix C. Training on awareness is very key
since personnel or humans are perceived as the weak link in relation to maritime
cyber security breaches (Safa & Maple, 2016). Therefore, the need for training of
personnel or the human factor is consistent with studies by Heering et al. (2021),
where they indicated that training of the human element would reduce the chances of
cyber attacks since cyber criminals mostly target humans to achieve their end state.

Figure 8. The results of respondents on formal training on maritime cyber security
Source (Researcher)
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4.2.3 Association between demographic data and awareness of maritime
cyber security
A bivariate analysis2 was conducted to determine the association between
demographic data and awareness on maritime cyber security. This was tested using
95% confidence level. The results showed that that the following demographic
variables were significantly associated with awareness; Age (χ2 = 3.752, p = 0.042),
educational level (χ2 =4.292, p = 0.018). Gender of respondents did not significantly
influence awareness on maritime cyber security at 5% level of significance (p>0.05)
(χ2 =2.752, p = 0.174) (Table 2).
Table 2: Association between demographic characteristics and Awareness. Source
(Researcher)
Awareness level n (%)
Low
High
Age
18-30
31-40
41-50
>50
Educational level
Basic
SSS/SHS
HND/Diploma
First Degree
Master’s Degree
Gender
Male
Female
*Significant at p<0.05

4.2.4

30 (68.2)
11(25.0)
2 (4.5)
1(2.3)

14 (19.4)
54 (75.2)
2 (2.7)
2 (2.7)

χ2

p-value

3.752

0.042*

4.292

0.018*

2.752

0.174

Total
44 (37.9)
65 (56.0)
4 (3.4)
3 (2.7)

6 (13.6)
21(47.7)
4 (9.1)
11(25.0)
2 (4.6)

2 (2.8)
26 (36.1)
10 (13.9)
28 (38.9)
6 (8.3)

8 (6.9)
47 (40.5)
14 (12.1)
39 (33.6)
8 (6.9)

40 (90.9)
4 (9.1)

69 (94.5)
3 (5.5)

109 (93.9)
7 (6.1)

Multiple Logistic Regression of factors influencing Awareness

Multiple logistic regression analysis was conducted on all demographic
characteristics that were found to be statistically significant or not at the bivariate
level. These factors were; age, educational level and gender. The results show that
2

It is one of the forms of statistical analysis, used to find out if there is a relationship between two
sets of values.
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with age, respondents who were between the ages of 31-40 years were approximately
three times more likely to have a high level of awareness of maritime cyber security
compared to those with age between 18-30 years (AOR=2.55; 95% CI=1.029-5.919,
p=0.017). The logistic regression results further showed that respondents who had
first degree level of education had an increased odd of having a high level of
awareness of maritime cyber security compared to those with basic level of
education (AOR= 1.82; 95% CI=1.174-5.728, p=0.025). Regarding gender, females
were more likely to have a high level of awareness of maritime cyber security
compared to their male counterparts although the association was not statistically
significant (AOR= 1.28; 95% CI=0.782-4.719, p=0.285) (Table 3).
Table 3: Multiple Logistics regression of the factors associated with Awareness.
Source (Researcher)
Awareness
Variable

High

COR (95%Cl)

AOR (95%CI)

30 (68.2)
11(25.0)
2 (4.5)
1(2.3)

14 (19.4)
54 (75.2)
2 (2.7)
2 (2.7)

1.0 (ref)
2.84 (1.231-5.629)
0.81 (0.35-2.537)
0.72 (0.385-2.852)

1.0 (ref)
2.55 (1.029-5.919)
0.92 (0.582-2.874)
0.65(0.291-3.728)

0.017*
0.149
0.282

6 (13.6)
21(47.7)
4 (9.1)
11(25.0)
2 (4.6)

2 (2.8)
26 (36.1)
10 (13.9)
28 (38.9)
6 (8.3)

1.0 (ref)
0.32 (0.201-2.345)
0.12 (0.067-1.922)
2.92(1.229-5.387)
0.48 (0.2827-1.643)

1.0 (ref)
0.44(0.115-2.820)
0.27 (0.127-2.855)
1.82(1.174-5.728)
0.42(0.287-1.729)

0.163
0.284
0.025*
0.181

40 (90.9)
4(9.1)

69 (94.5)
3(5.5)

1.0 (ref)
1.34 (0.628-4.625)

1.0 (ref)
1.28 (0.782-4.719) 0.285

Low

p-value

Age (yrs)

18-30
31-40
41-50
>50
Educational level
Basic
SSS/SHS
HND/Diploma
First Degree
Master’s Degree
Gender
Male
Female
*p<0.05,
reference

ref:

AOR:
Adjusted Odds
Ratio
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COR: Crude odds Ratio

4.2.3 Assessing the preparedness of the navy against cyber attacks
To help assess the preparedness of the Navy against cyber attacks, a one
sample T-test was used. Three main questions were asked in the survey
questionnaires and scored were assigned to the answers that participants
selected. After the feedback, a hypothesis was established to help
establish this answer. The hypothesis was that; The Ghana Navy is
prepared to deal with cyber attacks. The mean test value assigned was 3.5
and p-value of 0.05. If p less than 0.05, the null hypothesis will be
rejected. After the SPSS was used to analysis the one sample t-test, it
revealed that the mean difference was 1.85345 compared with the test
value of 3.5. From results Table it implies that null hypothesis should be
rejected, since the mean difference is lower from the test value, implying
that the navy’s preparation is not adequate. However, since the mean
difference is not that much from the test value, in terms of percentage
gives approximately 53%. It can be concluded that the navy’s preparation
against cyber attacks is average. Hence there is the need to invest in more
cyber security solutions and training of personnel in that regard.

Figure 10. Results of one sample t-test

Source (Reseacher)
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4.3

Research Findings: Qualitative Analysis and Discussion

The qualitative survey was aimed at focusing on RQ3. The feedback from the
interviewees helped the researcher to develop a proposed maritime cyber security
framework for the navy. Eight (8) interviews were conducted using semi structured
questions; additionally, nine (9) structured questions on the same interview guide
questions were sent through QuestionPro link generated for the intended
interviewees to answer due to their busy schedule, not allowing for the interview.
The recorded interviews took approximately 20 to 30 minutes. They were later
transcribed, coded and finally analyzed with the MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2022,
software. Subsequent paragraphs are the outcomes and discussions of the interview
guide questions.

Q1. How important is maritime cyber security to the operations of navies in
general?
This question was meant to ascertain the importance of maritime cyber security to
the operations of navies in general. Here, all the respondents indicated that maritime
cyber security is very important to the operations of the navies and security in
general. For instance, Interviewee (INT) 3 indicated that:
“Maritime Cyber Security is very important in the operations of navies,
because naval operations rely on navigational and surveillance systems. The
integration of maritime transport systems into a digitized world through the
use of GPS, ECDIS, Satellites, Radars, surveillance systems, and other
shipboard security systems to mention a few. If they are not secured well, it
can be vulnerable to cyber threats”.

In addition, most of the interviewees intimated that most navies have integrated
systems that help them with communications, surveillance, and navigation of their
platforms, and also assist with the operations of their shore-based installations,
therefore there is the need for navies to take maritime cyber security very important
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and factor it into their safety management system. On the contrary, others intimated
that although important, maritime cyber attacks in recent times serve as very critical
threat to the maritime sector because cyber security awareness is very low in terms of
cyber security knowledge and skills. Consequently, navies are required to play a lead
role in developing policies or frameworks for cyber security. Additionally, navies
need to improve their cyber security awareness through information sharing, capacity
building, and awareness raising by working together closely with other key maritime
stakeholders to strengthen and keep their cyberspace secured from cyber threat
challenges.

Further, three (3) main codes or themes were assigned using the MAXQDA
Analytics Pro; Cyber threats, Role and Systems. These three (3) themes were the
most frequent in the respondents’ feedback. Approximately 65% of the respondents
as part of their explanation intimated that maritime cyber security is important
because of the existence of cyber threat, as illustrated in Figure 11. Further, 47% of
the respondents agreed to its importance in relation to the systems employed in
navies. The respondents believed that the systems employed by navies should be
well secured or protected.

To confirm the importance of maritime cyber security to the maritime industry
including navies, Hareide et al. (2018) explained that naval operations and maritime
operations are not immune to cyber threats, since the maritime industry has
embraced technology in their day to day operations, hence the need for education on
the part of their personnel is paramount. Furthermore, the feedback from this
question is consistent with the studies of Karamperidis et al. (2021) and Tam &
Jones (2018), who indicated that maritime cyber security is indeed important for the
protection or securing of maritime assets including shore-based surveillance
installations against cyber threats, hence less knowledge on it could lead to cyber
criminals attacks valuable systems of the maritime industry.
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Figure 11. The three (3) themes assigned to the importance of maritime cyber
security.
Source (Researcher)

Q2.

What are some of the weak links with respect to maritime cyber security

governance/management?

This inquiry was intended to determine the weak links with regard to maritime cyber
security management. To analyze this question, four (4) main codes or themes were
assigned

using

the

MAXQDA

Analytics

Pro;

Governance,

Resources,

Communication Systems and Human beings were the themes that recurred the most
in the interviews. All the interviewees revealed that indeed there are weak links
when it comes to maritime cyber security management. After the analysis, the result
indicated that approximately 88% of the interviewees indicated that human beings
form the weakest link when it comes to maritime cyber attacks by cybercriminals
(Figure 12). For example, INT 1 explained that:
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“No industry or organization is immune to cyber threats. The maritime
industry including navies relies on ICT Base systems for their operations. The
integration of cyber technologies into maritime or naval operations comes
with major vulnerabilities. Primarily personnel in the maritime industry
including that of navies lack education in maritime cyber security. This
makes the human element or beings act as weak links for cybercriminals to
take advantage of. For instance, the unacceptable use of personal USB sticks
and connected devices of personnel that breach cyber security protocols.”

Figure 12: The four (4) themes assigned to maritime cyber security weak links.
Source (Researcher)

The 88% response on human beings or human element forming the weakest link is
consistent with other studies such as Boletsis et al., 2021 and Meshkat et al., 2020,
where their work revealed that although the safety and security issues have many
facets or layers, the human factor continues to be one of the largest internal dangers
to organizations' cybersecurity. Further, the aforementioned feedback from the
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analysis is supported by the results of the recent white paper on cybersecurity
published by BIMCO where 52% of respondents regarded humans as the greatest
cyber security risk or vulnerability facing their organizations (HIS Markit, 2020). In
addition to this, the most recent Verizon Data Breach study reveals the fact that the
human element was involved in 85 % of all data breaches (Verizon, 2021).

Similarly, according to authors like Senarak (2021) and, Felsik and Zwolak (2020),
the human factor interface continues to account for the majority of maritime
accidents including maritime cyber attacks, therefore, making it the weakest link
when it comes to cyber security. This is mainly due to the fact that personnel or crew
lack adequate awareness in terms of training, knowledge, skill as well as experience
when it comes to maritime cyber security. Hence, cybercriminals take advantage of
their lack of awareness through emotional manipulation or social engineering.

Furthermore, 35.3% of the interviewees explained that resources serve as the weak
link in maritime cyber security. Also, 29.4% generally intimated that a lack of good
communication systems such as robust ICT infrastructures could act as weak links
that the cybercriminals could prey on. This is consistent with the studies of
Abdalrahman and Varol (2021), who revealed that security technology is only as
good as its strong systems including communication systems. They also indicated
that if the security networks of the systems including communication and
surveillance systems and their softwares are not strong or patched well and up-todate, it makes the connected devices serve as chief targets or weak links for cyber
attackers. From the aforementioned, it is, therefore, necessary for organizations
including navies to enhance the security of their connected systems or devices.

It is worth noting that, approximately 12% of the interviewees explained that
governance also plays a role as a weak link in the architecture of maritime cyber
security management. They emphasized that lack of governance such as policies,
procedures, and good cyber hygiene practices to mention a few have not been fully
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put in place for systems that are been used daily. The issue of governance is
supported by Christou (2016), who indicated that there is still not overall governance
for the framework on network and information security including maritime cyber
security. The concept itself requires extensive explanation in order to convey
information to the average sailor or rating in the navy. To this end, it is imperative
that policies, procedures, and good cyber hygiene practices are made available and
integrated into the training of naval officers and ratings.

Q3

What are your views on what an optimal framework would look like? or

What would its essential components look like?
This question was meant to find out what an optimal framework looks like and it
essential components or basic principles. The feedback that was generated from the
interview enabled the researcher to assign five (5) themes using the MAXQDA
Analytics Pro; namely Roles and Regulations, Sanctions, Training, Cybersecurity
Plan, and NIST Framework as the components of a framework. Eighty-one per cent
(81%) of the interviewees as demonstrated in Figure 13, explained that for an
optimal framework, its component should constitute some elements of the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) or the NIST CSF should serve as a baseline for
establishing organizations including navies’ maritime cyber security framework. The
elements of the NIST CSF include recover, identify, protect, respond and detect
cyber security risks.
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Figure 13. The five (5) themes assigned to components of maritime cyber security
framework. Source (Researcher)

The feedback on the elements of the NIST Framework forming part of an optimal
framework of an organization is in line with the study of Gordon et al. (2020) who
revealed that organizations and government agencies including navies all over the
world have widely embraced the NIST CSF in their security architecture. It is, in
fact, worthy to note that, the NIST CSF has swiftly emerged as not just one of the
most frequently approved methods, but also one of the most globally acknowledged
frameworks overall, which supports cybersecurity risk management within
organisations. It is therefore essential for Ghana Navy to adopt the elements of the
NIST Cybersecurity framework as a basis for developing its maritime cyber security
framework to guide its operations.

Similarly, the navy could also complement the NIST CSF with some elements of the
ISO 27001, which is the international Standard for best practice Information Security
Management Systems (ISMS) including maritime cyber security. The ISO 27001 is
stringent and thorough in terms of its guidelines for ensuring data or systems are safe
and secure in accordance with the tenets of CIA Model (El-Bably, 2021). The
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possibility of the navy complementing the NIST CSF with ISO 27001 is supported b
Sulistyowati et al. (2020) in their study revealed organization could implement some
features of the NIST CSF together with other frameworks such the ISO 27001, and
COBIT to mention a few.

Also, approximately 44% of the interviewees as part of their responses indicated the
need for a Cyber Security Plan (CSP) to be part of the essential components of the
maritime cyber framework. Having a CSP as part of the maritime cyber security
framework undeniably will assist to handle the security vulnerabilities in the related
security evaluations by instituting standard precautions tailored to decrease the
chance of a security breach and the repercussions of potential risks. The CSP being
part of the cyber security framework is supported by the study of Turk et al. (2022)
who assert that CSP is critical in coming up with a systematic framework to address
cybersecurity in the construction sector.

Besides the CSP, 37.5% of respondents also pointed out that training should form
part of the components of a framework for maritime cyber security. With the training
component there, it will aid to raise the awareness of all personnel in the
organization or navy on cyber security and not just for the IT personnel alone.
Additionally, 12.5% explained that sanctions should be part of the components of the
framework. When sanctions are part of it, it will deter operators or uses of systems
who flout the cyber security protocols.

4.4.

Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the research finding and the discussions as well. It looked at
both the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the findings in this study and the
discussions deduced from them. It was quantitative analysis was done using SPSS
and other statistical analysis to arrive at the discussion. It was revealed that the level
of awareness of maritime cyber security was high. However, in terms of
preparedness for cyber attacks, the preparedness was assessed to be average from the
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single t-test conducted using hypothesis generated for that. Also, MAXQDA
Analytics Pro was used to analyse the qualitative aspect of the study. It was revealed
from the interviews conducted that the human element forms the weakest link in
maritime cyber security management which was consistent with most available
literatures. It was also noticed that the navy currently has no maritime cyber security
framework available.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1

Introduction

The chapter presents the conclusion, limitations and some recommendations for
decision-making and future research relating to maritime cyber security.

5.2

Conclusion

This study was sparked by the dangers that cyber attacks or threats pose to the
maritime industry as a result of low or poor awareness on maritime cyber security
and the lack of preparedness of the maritime industries including navies to mitigate
this threat. Hence related publications concerning maritime security threats including
maritime cyber security, cyber attacks in the maritime industry, human elements as
weak links to maritime cyber security helped with the theoretical as aspect of the
research. The study was aimed at assessing the level of awareness of maritime cyber
security in navies of the GoG countries, with a focus on Ghana Navy. Furthermore, it
aimed at determining if the navy is prepared to handle cyberattacks. Therefore, the
study assessed maritime cyber security awareness in the Ghana Navy.

Further assessment was done with respect to the demographic data gathered such as
age and educational background. Therefore, the objectives of the study were
achieved by analyzing statistically the questionnaire data collected. It was revealed
that the level of awareness of maritime cyber security in the Ghana Navy was
assessed to be high. In terms of age, it was revealed that those in the age range of
31-40 years had a high level of awareness of maritime cyber security compared to
the other age ranges. Additionally, the logistic regression results disclosed that
respondents who had a first degree level of education had an increased odd of having
a high level of awareness of maritime cyber security paralleled to those with basic
level of education. However, when various maritime threats including maritime
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cyber attacks were presented to participants to rate them, participants rated maritime
cyber security the least.

In addition, the study sought to determine how the navy was prepared to deal with
cyber attacks. It was revealed that the level of preparation was average after the
single t-test was conducted. Hence, there is a need for investment in robust maritime
cyber security solutions and effective training of personnel in relation to cyber
security. To investigate if the Ghana Navy has any maritime cyber security
framework guiding its operations, it was disclosed that there is currently no
framework on maritime cyber security, however, the relevant departments have been
tasked to generate one. The interview analysis results together with other relevant
documents assisted the researcher to develop a proposed maritime cyber security
framework illustrated in Figure 14 that will help the Ghana Navy in the interim.
Appendix D recapitulates the details of the proposed framework. The study therefore
supports the need to develop maritime cyber security and improve upon training of
personnel on maritime cyber security. Furthermore, the study tends to agree with
other literatures on human element being the weakest link in maritime cyber security.
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Protect Systems
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Figure 14. Proposed maritime cyber security framework structure.
Source (Created by Author)
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All Departments

5.2

Recommendations

Following the key analysis and subsequent discussions made, the recommendations
can be expressed as a systematic approach and grouped into 3 main areas which
could be integrated into the SMS of the navy (Dalaklis, 2017). The areas include
Training, Equipment/Systems and Polices/Procedures.

5.2.1

Training

a.

The Ghana Navy should design a maritime cyber security education

and training and further incorporate this education and training in its training
institutions to help raise the awareness of personnel on maritime cyber
security.

b.

The Ghana Navy should ensure that naval personnel receive the

appropriate and adequate maritime cyber security skill and knowledge to man
its integrated systems.

5.2.2

Policies/Procedures (Framework)

a.

The navy should collaborate with other stakeholders like the Ghana

Maritime Authority to come up with a robust framework on maritime cyber
security in guiding its operations. Element of the NIST CSF and ISO 27001
should be factored when developing framework which will constitute among
other things, the policies and procedures.

b.

Since every framework has an output and input elements, the Ghana

Navy should ensure that these outputs and inputs of the framework when
developed are documented and frequently evaluated to serve as feedback
mechanism for improvement.

5.2.3. Integrated Systems/ Equipment
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The Ghana Navy should ensure integrated systems or ICT-based equipment
are well secured through the use of softwares patches and up to date as well.

Additionally, the Navy should ensure that there are comprehensive recovery
plans for the systems or equipment employed.

5.3.

Limitations and future research

a.

Out of the 116 respondents who showed their consent to participate in the

survey, only 6 were female. Future researchers could increase the sample size and
involve more or adequate female participation. This will go a long way to enable the
researcher to draw comprehensive inferences on the level of awareness of maritime
cyber security between males and females of the navy.

b.

Lack of scholarly data on cyber attack incidents on navies in the GoG or

Africa as a whole posed a limitation and hence delayed the researcher in gathering
quality data for the literature review.

c.

Furthermore, limitations were posed during the collection of data and

responses from the questionnaire. It was observed that most of the personnel who
initially had wanted to participate declined to participate because they were afraid of
giving information regarding policies and procedures in connection to maritime
cyber attacks, since they saw it as confidential and hence not willing to report.

d.

Future researchers could investigate the type of maritime cyber security

knowledge as well as skills training that the Navy could use to train personnel.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Survey Questionnaire

CONSENT FORM
Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research survey, which is carried out in
connection with a Dissertation that will be written by the researcher, in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime at the
World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden. The topic of the Dissertation is
ASSESSING MARITIME CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS IN NAVIES OF
THE GULF OF GUINEA COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA.
The information provided by you in this survey will be used for research purposes
and the results will form part of a dissertation, which will later be published online in
WMU's digital repository (maritime commons) subject to final approval of the
University and made available to the public. Your personal information will not be
published. You may withdraw from the research at any time, and your personal data
will be immediately deleted.
Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a
World Maritime University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the
degree is awarded.
Your participation in the survey is highly appreciated.
Student’s name

Kwadwo Forson-Adaboh

Specialization

Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration
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Email address

w2005014@wmu.se

I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I
understand that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the
strictest confidence, and will be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.
Name:
………………………………………………………………………
Signature:
………………………………………………………………………
Date:
………………………………………………………………………
Dear Participant

This survey questionnaire guide is developed to help the researcher gather data on
ASSESSING MARITIME CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS IN NAVIES OF
THE GULF OF GUINEA COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA.

This research aims to assess the level of awareness of maritime cyber security in
navies of the GoG countries and how prepared they are to handle cyberattacks, with
a focus on the Ghana Navy.

The research is part of the requirement for the Master of Science in Maritime Affairs
degree award, with a specialization in Maritime Safety and Environmental
Administration. This survey questionnaire would take not more than 30 minutes of
your time.

The information you will provide in this form is for academic purposes only and will
therefore be treated with maximum confidentiality. The research data will be
disposed of upon completion of the dissertation. Your participation is very much
appreciated and will form part of the success and realization of the study.

Please should you have any inquiries on the aforementioned, kindly contact me via
email at w2005014@wmu.se

or via WhatsApp number +233243247276. Further,
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be assured that your responses would be in compliance with the Data Privacy Act
2012.

Thank you for your attention, and I will be looking forward to your responses to the
questionnaire. Kindly provide the responses where appropriate, tick or write.

Section A:

Demographics
18 – 30 years

31 – 40 years

1.

Age.

2.

Gender.

Male

Unit:

_________________________

Department:

______________

3.

above 40 years

Female

Level of education.
Masters
First Degree
HND
SSS/SHS
Others (Please Specify)

Section B:

4.

_________________________

Assessing maritime cyber security awareness

Which of the following do you consider a threat to Ghana’s maritime

security?
Very

1

Low
Drug Trafficking
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2

3

4

5

Extremely

Maritime Cyber
attacks
Human Trafficking
Piracy
Smuggling
Armed Robbery
IUU fishing

Other (Please specify)

5.

In your view, how would you rate the level of technology employed in the

Ghana Navy with respect to Ghana's maritime security?

1

2

3

4

5

Very Low

6.

Extremely

How would you rate the threat of maritime cyber attacks in the Ghana Navy?

1

2

3

4

Very Low

5
Extremely

Briefly explain your reason for the above selection.
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(Minimum of 50 words)

7.

a.

List any type of cyber attacks you know and rank them in a priority.

b.

Which of the following types of cyber attacks in your view do you think the

navy is likely to be vulnerable to?

Malware
Phishing
Man-in-Middle
DoS & DDoS
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c.

Are there any other cyber attacks not specified above? Kindly name them.

8.

Have you or your unit been exposed to any form of cyber attack before?

Not sure

No

Yes

If Yes, how many times and briefly describe the incident. (Minimum 50 words)

9.

Have you heard of the term maritime cyber security?
Not sure

No

Yes

If Yes, in your view, what does the term maritime cyber security mean?

10.

How important is maritime cyber security to your daily job and activities?

(Minimum 50 words)
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11.

Does the navy have available educational training regarding maritime cyber

security and cyber best practices?

Not sure

No

Yes

If Yes, describe the nature of the course.

12.

a.

(Minimum 50 words)

Have you undergone any official training on maritime cyber security

as naval personnel or operator?

Not sure

No

Yes

b.

If Yes, how many times?

c.

If Yes, what was the duration of the training given?
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13.

Do you think you need further training on maritime cyber security

Not sure

No

Yes

Section C: Assessing Standard Operating Procedures

14.

a.

How often are the softwares in your unit updated?

1

2

3

4

5

Rarely

b.

Frequently

How often do you go online with the department’s computers/systems?

1

2

3

4

5

Rarely

c.

Frequently

How often are you allowed to connect your personnel devices to the unit’s

computers/systems?

1

2

3

4

Rarely

Section D:

5
Frequently

Preparedness of the navy against cyber attacks.

64

15.

When was the last time your department/platform carried out a cyber security

assessment?

Not sure

No idea

Once a month

More than once a month

16.

Does the navy have any preventative measures established regarding

maritime cyber Security?

Not sure

17.

No

Yes

Are there any swift measures established by the navy in terms of recovery of

systems should there be any maritime cyber attack.

Not sure

18.

No

Yes

Is there any additional information you would like to share in relation to

maritime cyber security?
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Appendix 2
Personal Interview Guide
CONSENT FORM
Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview, which is carried out in
connection with a dissertation which will be written by the researcher, in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime at the
World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden.
The topic of the dissertation is ASSESSING MARITIME CYBER SECURITY
AWARENESS IN NAVIES OF THE GULF OF GUINEA COUNTRIES: A CASE
STUDY OF GHANA.
The information provided by you in this interview will be used for research purposes
and the results will form part of a dissertation, which will later be published online in
WMU's digital repository (maritime commons) subject to final approval of the
University and made available to the public. Your personal information will not be
published. You may withdraw from the research at any time, and your personal data
will be immediately deleted.
Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a
World Maritime University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the
degree is awarded.
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Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.
Student’s name

Kwadwo Forson-Adaboh

Specialization

Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration

Email address

w2005014@wmu.se

I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I
understand that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the
strictest confidence, and will be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.
Name:
………………………………………………………………………
Signature:
………………………………………………………………………
Date:
………………………………………………………………………
Dear Participant,

This interview guide is developed to assist the researcher to gather data on
ASSESSING MARITIME CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS IN NAVIES OF
THE GULF OF GUINEA COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA.

The research aims to determine the level of awareness of maritime cyber security in
navies of the GoG countries and how prepared they are to handle cyberattacks, with
a focus on the Ghana Navy. It forms part of the requirement for the Master of
Science in Maritime Affairs degree award, with a specialization in Maritime Safety
and Environmental Administration.

This interview aims to determine how to establish an effective maritime cyber
security regulatory framework for guiding the operations of the Ghana Navy. Your
responses will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will be used only for
academic purposes. Your participation is highly appreciated.

Name (optional):

___________________________________________

Organization / Unit:

___________________________________________

Position:

___________________________________________

Number of years in position: ___________________________________________
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This interview will be centered around the following questions:

1. How important is maritime cyber security to the operations of navies in
general?
2. What are some of the weak links with respect to maritime cyber security
governance/management?
3. Is it necessary for navies to establish a regulatory framework for addressing
maritime cyber security issues? Does the Ghana Navy have any maritime
cyber security framework and what are its basic principles?

4. What are your views on what an optimal framework would look like? or
What would its essential components look like?

5. How should an effective regulatory framework be established in the
governance/management of maritime cyber security?

Thank you!
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Appendix 3
Preparation of the navy against maritime cyber attacks
How often does your unit/department carry out maritime cyber security
assessments?

Does the navy have any preventive measures established regarding maritime cyber
security?
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Are there any swift measures established by the navy in terms of recovery of systems
should there be any maritime cyber attack?

70

Appendix 4

71

Appendix 5

72

73

